HEADQUARTERS 41ST BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M)

APO 240 (R)

2 February 1944

MISSION REPORT

Mission 90

1.  MISSION: (A) 2 Flights with 12 X 100 lb GP, ground installations of WOTJE ISLAND, secondary target.  (B) 1 Flight loaded with 4 X 500 lb GP shipping at WOTJE, if sighted, otherwise heavy ground installations of secondary target.

2.  TARGETS ATTACKED: 1 Flight over lagoon hit shipping.  Two flights over WOTJE ISLAND.  Over target at 300527Z.  1 X 125 - 150 AK believed hit.  Secondary target bombed and strafed.

3.  TAKE OFF: From MULLINIX FIELD nine B-25 type A/Ps from 300128Z to 300134Z.

4.  AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED: Nine A/Ps from 396th Bombardment Group (M), 41st Bombardment Group (M).

5.  AIRCRAFT ABORTIVE: None.

6.  BOMB LOAD:   A/P     367      4 X 500 lb GP     8-11 sec delay fuse

                         778      4 X 500 lb GP     8-11 sec delay fuse

                         809      4 X 500 lb GP     8-11 sec delay fuse

                         780     12 X 100 lb GP     8-11 sec delay fuse

                         621     12 X 100 lb GP     8-11 sec delay fuse

                         825     12 X 100 lb GP     8-11 sec delay fuse

                         777     12 X 100 lb GP     8-11 sec delay fuse

                         616     12 X 100 lb GP     8-11 sec delay fuse

                         284     12 X 100 lb GP     8-11 sec delay fuse

7.  ROUTE OUT: From MULLINIX FIELD on course 333 deg true for 120 minutes at 157 knots.  Changed to 358 deg true for 90 minutes at 157 knots.  Changed to 250 deg true for 6 minutes at 175 knots.  Changed to 175 deg true until target sighted (about 8 minutes).

8.  APPROACH:  Course 176 deg true, speed 230 mph, altitude 25 ft.  Formation changed to line abreast. 

9.  ATTACK:  Course 154 deg true, speed 235 mph, altitude 100 ft.  Bombs away at 300527Z.  Formation line abreast.

    A/P 367:  No target.  Bombs not dropped.

    A/P 778:  1 bomb hit 125 - 150 ft. AK West of SW tip of runway "B".  3 other bombs hit in lagoon with no visible results.  AK NW and SW tips of island strafed, results unobserved.

    A/P 809:  2 bombs hit on SW tip of island, 2 others in water south of target.  Also strafed target.  No results observed.

    A/P 780:  2 bombs hit gun position on N end of island, 2 on L shaped building in barracks area, 2 on S edge of service apron, 2 at pier, 2 on large building North of South apron, and 2 on building about 1500 ft. SW of barracks area, strafed on approach, stopping meager S/A fire.

    A/P 621:  8 bombs in barracks area, 2 bombs on service apron, 2 bombs N of NW turning circle of runway "A".  Gun positions in barracks strafed.

    A/P 825:  Bombs not dropped due to malfunction.  Strafed wooden building on NE shore, large concrete building (50-60 ft. square) N or runway "B", few scattered frame buildings on shore E of intersection of runways.

    A/P 777:  All bombs in target area, hitting blockhouse on N tip of island probable fuel dump about 700 ft. SE of north tip of island, and in area south of SE turning circle runway "A".  Target strafed during run.

    A/P 284:  Shot down by U.S. Navy fighters(details given in later report).  No information available.

10.  INTERCEPTION:  None.

11.  TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY:  None.

12.  BOMBS JETTISIONED:  A/P 367:  4 X 500 lb GP in water south of target to save gasoline as formation was approaching bad weather.

13.  AA FIRE:  First fired on by possible AA fire from second small island north of WOTJE, meager and inaccurate.  AW and SA fire over target was moderate to intense and inaccurate.  SA fire from south tip, possible 12 positions, intense but inaccurate.  Known positions fired.  Evasive tactics consisted of speed and slight variation in altitude.

14.  ENEME AIRCRAFT LOSSES:  None.

15.  OUR LOSSES:  A/P 284:  Shot down by F6Fs from U.S. Naval Task Force at 300551Z.  Position 8 deg 10 minutes N, 170 deg 25 minutes E.  Seen to make a water landing.  Planes of U.S. Naval Task Force were circling A/P when last observed.  5 members of crew were later rescued by DD of task force.

     A/P  780:  Crash landed in lagoon about 5 miles from MULLINIX FIELD as result of damage sustained when attacked by F6Fs.  Entire crew rescued.

16.  OUR DAMAGE:  A/P 367:  Hole in right rudder.  Large hole in right horizontal stabilizer.  Hole in fuselage above bomb bay.  Right blister window in navigator's compartment cracked.  Bombardier's escape hatch replaced at MAKIN.  Entrance hatch in navigator's compartment replaced at MAKIN.  Defroster lines in bombardier's compartment damaged and needs replacing.  Hydraulic press accumulator guage damaged.  Manifold pressure line to right engine repaired at MAKIN.

     A/P 778:  Several holes in left and right vertical stabilizers (caused by side gun firing).

     A/P 809:  Large hole on top of left wing at the leading edge near wing tip.  Hole in left vertical stabilizer.

     A/P 621:  Large holes in the left inboard flaps.  Large hole in fuselage at turret compartment, and center of fuselage (right side).  Hole in fuselage enar horizontal stabilizer, center line fo fuselage.

     A/P 825:  Hole in left bomb bay door.

17.  OUR CASUALTIES:  1st Lt Trucker, Donald N., 0-XXXXXX, Pilot.  Possible cerebral concussion.  Compound fracture of nouse.  Laceration of right eyelid.  Sprain right wrist.

     2nd Lt Moore, Hohn W., 0-XXXXXX, Co-Pilot on 780.  Possible cerebral concussion.  Laceration of chin.

     2nd Lt Clay, Ernest J. Jr., 0-XXXXXX, Bomb-Nav on 780.  Possible cerebral concussion.  Severe contusion of left lower leg.  Possible simple fracture of right lower interior rib.

     2nd Lt Doyle, Anrdrew A., 0-XXXXX, Bomb-Nav on 780.  Gunshot wound (NG) right lower leg due to fire by U.S. Navy F6F fighter planes.

     S/Sgt Ropp, Conrad M., XXXXXXXX, engineer on 780.  Possible cerebral concussion, possible fracture of left posterior lower ribs.  Laceration of right eyebrow and right wrist.  Sprain of right ankle.

     S/Sgt Shields, James H. Jr., XXXXXXXX, armor-gunner on 780.  Possible cerebral concussion.  Multiple minor lacerations and abrasions.

     Sgt Martinovic, Frank M., XXXXXXXX, radio operator-gunner on 780.  Simple fracture on right femur mid 1/3 with impairment of circulation and nerve supply of leg below the fracture.

     Sgt Cota, Floyd J., XXXXXXXX3, armorer-gunner on 616.  Right lense of glasses shattered in eye during jar receive din plane.

     Sgt Smith, Robert V., XXXXXXXX, engineer on 367.  Laceration wound of right hand.

     Pvt Bedford, Lester J., XXXXXXXX, engineer on 777.  Lacerated wound of right third finger.

     Five members of crew of A/P 284, shot down by U.S. Navy Fighters, were rescued by Navy.  No details available at this time.

18.  OBSERVATIONS:  125-150 ft AK hit by 500 lb GP bomb from A/P 778.  A/P 809 observed bomb burst from A/P 778 to make direct hit into hull of AK.  The first bomb was short and the third and fourth bombs went over the Ak.  Intense oil fire started N of north turning circle of runway "A", due to direct hit by A/P 777 on revetted building.  Orange fire 150 ft. high and heavy smoke visible for 20 miles from target from altitude of 25 ft.  Grey and white smoke observed off shore west of south service apron.  Heavy black smoke and intense red fire started south of runway intersection.  Smoke visible 20 miles from target 400 feet high.  Six damaged single engine A/Ps observed in vicinity of NE turning circle runway "B".  Crane at end of L-shaped pier W of large service apron appears to be 25-30 feet high instead of 70-80 ft.  Radio station clearly visible on south end of island.  grey smoke and small fires observed in south barracks area.

19.  ROUTE BACK:  On course 154 deg true for 6 minutes at 175 knots, changed to 172 deg true for 15 minutes at 157 knots.  Changed to 192 deg true for 10 minutes at 161 knots.  Changed to 170 deg true for 30 minutes at 174 knots.  Changed to 151 deg true fro 89 minutes at 174 knots (MAKIN), thence on 170 deg true for 36 minutes at 170 knots (MULLINIX FIELD).

20.  LANDING:  All A/P except 284, 780, 367, and 616 landed at MULLINIX FIELD from 301040Z to 301050Z.  A/P 284 was shot down by U.S. Navy fighters.  A/P 780 made crash landing in lagoon about 5 miles from MULLINIX FIELD.  A/P 367 and 616 landed at MAKIN, then came to MULLINIX FIELD, landing approximately at 302100Z.

21.  WEATHER:  Route out:  Cloud base about 1,500 ft.  .4 to .8 coverage up to 06 deg North.  From 06 deg North to target .6 to .8 coverage with squalls and a front at 08 deg 30 min North to 09 deg 15 minutes North, wind 60 deg and 12 knots swinging to 08 deg and 12 to 14 knots.  At target:  Hazy.  Route back:  Same as route out.

22.  PHOTOS:  50 with K-21 type cameras.  Estimated coverage 10%.

23.  MALFUNCTIONS:  A/P 778:  Right top package gun would not fire.

     A/P 621:  3rd position stoppage of left turret gun.

     A/P 777:  V.H.F. poor.

     A/P 825:  Bomb-bay door handle in pilot's cockpit broke off.  Two generators out TARAWA to MAKIN, one XXXXXXXX out entire flight.

24.  XXXXXXXX:

25.  SUMMARY OF ATTACKS ON B-25S BY FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT AND SURFACE CRAFT:  the 9 B-25s left the target at 300528Z, closed into a V of Vs and proceeded on cuorse 154 deg true for 30 miles, then altered course to 172 deg true as previously planned.  After following later course for 35 miles to position 08 deg 10 min N - 170 deg 25 min E, a large naval force was sighted at 300545, 20 miles away; position 08 deg 10 min N - 170 deg 50 min E and heading about 210 deg true.  Surface craft were identified as friendly task force and B-25s immediately altered course to 192 deg true in order to avoid them.  Pilots checked to see that IFF was turned on and Began sending and repeating "H"s with Aldis lamp.  Time certain as signals were due to change at 300600ZS.  The B-25s then passed several DDs out on the perimeter of task force at a distance of 6 - 7 miles, while the main force was about 15 miles away.  Continuous "H"s were directed at nearest DDs but at 300548Z B-25s were fired upon by another DD.  Course was immediately changed to 230 deg true and signalling continued, with Aldis lamps, directed at DD.  AA bursts observed both over and short, adn AW fire was considerably short of B-25s.   DD ceased figing but immediately afterward B-25s were attacked by Hellcats.

     A/P 621:  Pair of Hellcats came in between 3 and 5 o'clock from out of a cloud about 800 yards from A/P, began to fire at 600 yards, getting in two bursts before breaking off at 200 yards.  Second pass made by two Hellcats in a similiar manner.  Blinker signals directed at Hellcats continuously.  A/P did not return their fire.

     A/P 825:  One Hellcat made pass at 7 o'clock position from approximately 1000 ft altitude.  Attack directed at A/P 825 and A/P 284 flying on left wing of A/P 825.  Pass was pressed to 200 yes before Hellcat broke away.  Fire not returned by A/P 825.  After this pass, crew of A/P 825 observed right engine and nacelle of A/P 284 burning and landing gear dropped down.  A/P 284, continued in formation for approximately 45 seconds with right prop not feathered, after in fell behind formation losing altitude until it stalled in the ocean.  After hitting water, plane continued fo smoke until lost in sight and three Hellcats were observed cycling above wreckage.

     Approximately 2 minutes after 1st pass, 2 other Hellcats made a pass at A/P 825 and A/P 616 which was flying or right wing of A/P 825.  Pass came from 3 o'clock, both Hellcats opening fire at 800 yds and continuing until pass was broken off to their left,  All during pass, Pilot was sending "Hs" with Aldis lamp pointed directly at attacking Hellcats.  A 3rd pass was made at 7 o'clock position abd broken off level at 400 yds.  No fire directed at any Hellcat at any time.

     A/P 809:  For passes observed at our formation by Hellcats in 2 ship elements.  Attacks pressed close to 200 yds.  IFF on and blink used constantly after task force was sighted.

     A/P 777:  3 passes came from 3 to 4 o'clock in spite of continuous use of blinker directed at Hellcats.  No fire directed at Hellcats by this airplane.

     A/P 367:  First pass made at 3 o'clock by 2 Hellcats from about 700 yds out and about 1000 ft altitude.  Fighters began firing at 600 yes and broke off at 250-300 yds.  Second pass by 2 Hellcats at 6 o'clock which commenced firing at 500 yds and broke away at 200 yds.

     A/P 616:  Passes were made at this A/P by 3 pair of Hellcats at the 4 o'clock position. Passes were straight and unopposed and their fire began at 400 yes and broke off at about 200 yes.

     A/P 778:  3 passes made at this A/P by Hellcats in 2 ship elements.  All passes unopposed.

     A/P 780:  2 passes made at this A/P.  One between 1 and 3 o'clock and the other about 5 o'clock.  This A/P hit several times.  Oil pressure fluctuated and then seemed to be satisfactory but controls handled heavily.  Arrived over MULLINIX FIELD about 300856Z and proceeded over lagoon to circle for landing.  When about 5 miles from runway right engine exploded and part of tail fell off.  A/P lost speed and altitude and stalled into water landing.  All of crew were rescued, but all were injured.

     The flight leader, stated that bad weather North and East of the Task Fprce prevented a turn away fro the sun.  This course would have lengthened the mission and increased fuel consumption considerably and taken the B-25s over MALOELAP where interception by enemy fighters would be expected.  The alternate course of turning away from the Task Force was chosen in order to insure the return of the B-25s to base.  The Task Force was sighted at 20 miles, B-25s altered course immediately and all element leaders checked to see that IFF was turned on.  Pilots began sending and continued to send recognition signals directly to the Task Force.  The same signals were flashed a attacking Hellcats since it was assumed that the Task Force had been advised of the time of the B-25 strike ordered on WOJTE and that Hellcat pilots would have been briefed on friendly planed and refrained from firing at them even after the initial attack.

     The mission was planned by Major McDAVID, Commanding Officer, as directed in the field order.  The position of friendly surface vessels as of 1200 LCT 29 January 1944 was plotted on air navigation chart (NO. V30-44) and their estimated positions at 1730 LCT were placed on this same chart.  The position of friendly surface vessels likely to be encountered as 1200 LCT 29 January 1944 were given to Major McDAVID by Major EUGUNE H. HAWKINS, intelligence officer, 41st Bomb Gp, who had previously received then from the Island Air Commander of ELLA.  They are as follows:

              True         

              Bearing       From          Distance      Course        Speed    

TG 50.15      343 deg       TARAWA 465           104 deg              12K

TG 58.1       343 deg       TARAWA 445           060 deg              12K

TG 58.2       320 deg       TARAWA 590           066 deg              12K

TG 58.3       320 deg       TARAWA 550           055 deg              12K

TG 50.16      320 deg       TARAWA 25            358 deg              23K

TG 50.15      3 Cruisers, 4 Destroyers, 2 Minelayers.

TG 58.1       3 Battleships, 3 Carriers, 1 Cruiser, 9 Destroyers.

TG 58.2

TG 58.3

TG 58.16      2 Minelayers

     The course to the target was then planned by Major McDAVID in order to avoid those friendly surface vessels and take off scheduled so that the target would be reached at 1730, the time of the attack in the Field Order.  From the information available no friendly surface vessels were expected to be sighted along the route selected.  The crews were briefed on operations by Captain WRIGHT, Operations Officer, on Intelligence by Captain McCLELLAND, Intelligence Officer, on Communications by Lt BASSETT, and on weather by Lt SMALL, 41st Bomb Gp Weather Officer.  Remarks concerning the target were made by Major McDAVID, and Lt. Col. WILLIE, Operations Officer of the 41st Bomb Gp, advised the crews that friendly bombardment of TA ROA ISLAND and WOTJE could be expected on 29 January 1944.  Major McDAVID then briefed the pilots on the positions where friendly naval vessels were likely to be encountered and imparted the same data to the navigators of each flight. The navigation on this mission was very good as the squadron was over the target at 1727 LCT, ow within 3 minutes of the given time of attack.  The attack on the target was successful and the crews interrogated state that the B-25s were not damaged while over the target.

     Attention is invited to the question as to whether friendly surface craft expected to be near the Eastern MARSHALL ISLANDS, 29 January 1944, were advised of the time of attack of the B-25 strike ordered against WOTJE.